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I am very grateful for the opportunity, provided by a panel on "American 
History after Post-Structuralism," to respond to such interesting papers by three 
historians of a new generation, an interdisciplinary exchange made possible 
because the AHA and MLA no longer hold their meetings at the same time. I am 
also happy to be hosted in print by American Studies, but I have chosen to 
maintain the focus of my remarks on disciplinary issues between literature and 
history—as complicated, rather than mediated, by "theory"—and not to address 
myself only to issues specific to Americanists. 
Apparently, to judge from the three papers, poststructuralism has not yet 
made much difference to the writing of American History. That is, the papers, 
amidst quite copious citations, refer to only a few articles and no books that might 
be examples, whether for better or worse, of the change produced in American 
historiography by the impact of poststructuralism. There are, it seems, no 
landmarks yet. This leads me to a question: have there been any other intellectual 
developments or movements in American historiography, the impact of which 
has been, in this way, discussed in advance of its occurrence? Even psychohistory, 
which provoked a lot of fuss and small results, had from the beginning the 
remarkable interdisciplinary foray of Erik Erikson's Young Man Luther. 
This apparent absence leads to a further question: Is it possible that the 
pattern of citation in these papers indicates a change in what will count as the 
"field" of American history? Such a question ("how do you define the field or 
discipline . . . ?") is the kind scholars in other fields, such as literary and 
philosophical studies, have been led to by the work associated with Jacques 
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Derrida, Michel Foucault, and others. In trying to answer it, I would note that on 
the one hand, the topic of "post-structuralism" has led these three American 
historians to refer to a wide range of writing that comes from other national and 
disciplinary traditions. I myself consider such developments wholesome for any 
field. On the other hand, I do not see anything in these papers to suggest that the 
most fundamental and familiar compartmentalization will be changed: the nation 
as the basic unit of historical understanding belongs to the old, but still effective, 
reorganization of knowledge that took place—roughly !—around 1800, an orga-
nization of knowledge that in many, various, ways Derrida, Foucault, Jean-
François Lyotard, and others have tried to help us criticize and look beyond, 
through their challenges to "master narratives" such as those of "man," "moder-
nity," "secularization," and others. Whatever else Nancy Isenberg's "women's 
history" may challenge, it rests content as "antebellum," and thus "American," 
history. 
This issue of moving beyond nationally-based limitations to new intellectual 
mappings is especially important to me because in my professional area, literary 
studies, the nation has been even more decisively influential than in history. At 
least historians are, for the most part, all in a single department, while, at least in 
universities, we are almost never in departments of "literature" but almost all 
segregated into units defined by national languages. My concern with the issue 
of the nation, as an often intellectually necessary focus for inquiry that can be 
terribly confining when made also the intellectual horizon of inquiry, means that 
I am uneasy with Saul Cornell's eagerness to use the work of Richard Rorty, for 
Rorty's liberal pragmatism takes its particular character from his frank avowal of 
"ethnocentrism" as an inevitable concomitant of the communal character of 
knowledge, and although himself an honorable person, Rorty may thus assist in 
legitimating some grim consequences of the current political scene, as I think he 
did in his New York Times Op-Ed piece a few weeks after the AHA panel.1 Yet 
as I thus begin to turn from my overall response to the three papers together 
towards my specific assessment of some particulars, paper by paper, I should 
emphasize that none of these three papers deliberately reinforces the national 
definition of "American" history even if none highlights it as a problem that 
poststructuralism might alter. 
Barry Shank's "Conjuring Evidence for Experience" defines its standpoint 
apart from either "history" or "post-structuralism" in the space of freedom 
provided by the interdisciplinary field of American Studies. It is extremely 
promising for a new American Studies that such a fine theoretical speculation 
should emerge from within it. Shank proves highly successful in evading the 
temptations of powerful dualisms—above all the "real" ("experience") and the 
"textual" ("evidence")—and highly skilled in his analyses at recognizing the 
argumentative temptations that have led others, whom he cites, to a spiraling of 
counter-insistences on one or another of just such binaries (he names, as further 
examples, knowledge / power, language / life, and text / context—the very pair 
so crucial in Saul Cornell's paper). 
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Shank's emphasis is rhetorical; he underlines the need for persuasive 
argument and locates the appeal to the "extra-textual real" precisely as an 
argumentative move. His emphasis recalls to me an observation from literary 
study: the split between "poetry" (as "imaginative") and "science" (as "empiri-
cal") is yet another version of Shank's key binary, and in the nineteenth century 
this split was exacerbated by the diminished role accorded to rhetoric in educa-
tional and intellectual life. It was only at this time that the study of poetry, even 
as it was educationally democratized, became a spiritual discipline of apprecia-
tion rather than a practical technique of production. The recovery of a rhetorical 
perspective is one of the ways, although by no means straightforward or 
uncomplicated, that poststructuralism may promise an enriched politics and 
culture. 
Shank understands that interpretation is an interminable process (not that no 
one ever concludes their own act of interpretation, but rather that no one person's 
interpretation assures that no other person will take up the task again), and yet he 
is not at all dismayed by this endlessness. This optimism, this feel of happy 
communalism, links Shank more with C. S. Peirce than with Nietzsche, whose 
perspective is more agonistic. Perhaps Peirce and Nietzsche, these two still living 
ghosts from a century ago, could have provided an overall frame for thinking 
about these three papers, except it would not now seem right to cast the whole 
issue so simply "between men." 
Nancy Isenberg in "Second Thoughts on Gender and Women's History" 
makes vigorous use of Foucault in her critiques of influential work on and in 
women's history by Joan Scott, Linda Kerber, Nancy Cott, and Suzanne Lebsock. 
(And I note that all the other works Isenberg discusses were familiar to me, but 
I was not aware of even having heard of Lebsock's, which evidently has become 
highly standard. Does this suggest that what Isenberg calls "U. S. antebellum 
women's history" has achieved the status of a full subfield, possessing its own 
literature important to those inside but no longer to those beyond?) Even as a 
woman participating in the project of women's history, Isenberg finds that 
women's historians are still historians like any others. Therefore, as she shows, 
they are open to question in light of Michel Foucault's critiques of historical 
theory and practice, for they "rely on identity and self-recognition as a stable 
anchor of their narratives" and will "use the strategies of originality, creativity, 
and continuity . . . as accepted parts of their scholarly practice." All these key 
categories have been challenged by Foucault, yet Isenberg herself wants to 
employ another key category that, as she recognizes in passing, Foucault judges 
no more effective, no less to be discarded than these others; nonetheless, she holds 
fast to the problem of the "concealment of ideology." 
Isenberg's strong concern with the "politics of women's history" is impor-
tant to her paper, and it is to me, too, but I find it still somewhat obscure. Isenberg 
evidently holds a political analysis by means of which to criticize Joan Scott's 
"Gender: A Useful Category of Analysis" more rigorously than seems to me 
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warranted. According to Isenberg, the problem is with Scott's "unarticulated 
political assertion that gender (carefully distanced from a less appealing feminist 
past) is the foundation on which to rebuild the field of women's history." I 
recognize that as an outsider to a field, I may be missing nuances and may simply 
not know key codings, but to my reading, Scott does not engage in gingerly 
political trimming but appears committed to a feminist future, in which gender 
will help what had been the restricted field of women's history transform the 
whole discipline. 
From the beginning of her discussion, Scott, I find, allies herself with 
transformative feminist politics, an alliance signaled by an early parenthetical 
comment about those who wish to distance themselves "from the (supposedly 
strident) politics of feminism." So where Isenberg finds Scott taking a distance 
from feminism, I find Scott taking an ironic distance from those who fret about 
feminism. Although Scott grants that the use of gender as a term to replace 
women's history forms one "facet of . . . the quest of feminist scholarship for 
academic legitimacy in the 1980s," she further observes, with an edge like that of 
her earlier parenthetical "supposedly," that the term gender "seems to pose no 
critical threat": to my reading the term seems indicates the divergence between 
Scott's view and the view of the threatened establishment. Early in the second 
part of the essay, in setting her constructive agenda for the term gender, Scott very 
explicitly identifies herself with feminists, I would say as a feminist, and not just 
intellectually. She claims that in the space opened by a shift "from scientific to 
literary paradigms" in the social sciences, "feminists have begun to find not only 
a theoretical voice of their own but scholarly and political allies as well." She 
continues, making crucial use of the first-person plural, "It is within this space that 
we must articulate gender as an analytic category." And the last sentence of the 
essay envisions the new history opened up by the analytic category of gender as 
providing "possibilities for thinking about current feminist political strategies 
and the (utopian) future."2 
Scott' s positive positions, then, seem to me more closely allied to Isenberg's 
than Isenberg will grant, and as critics of certain kinds of women's history the two 
also seem to me quite close. Isenberg criticizes Lebsock for taking from Gilligan 
a "totalizing" form of "essentialism." Scott attacks Gilligan's work for its 
"ahistorical, if not essentialist, notion of woman," which promotes the traditional 
opposition of masculine and feminine "in all its tedium and monotony."3 
Furthermore, part of the problem Isenberg has with Scott seems to arise from 
a generic misunderstanding. Isenberg wants Scott' s essay to "explain how gender 
might replace such dominant paradigms as 'separate spheres' or 'the cult of true 
womanhood'." That is, it seems to me, Isenberg demands that Scott's polemical, 
theoretical essay, addressed to the largest scale of historiography, nonetheless 
also yield immediate, specific results for the categories of Isenberg's own specific 
subfield. But not even Isenberg's own paper achieves this! Moreover, while 
Isenberg shows powerfully that Scott has gone only a little way with Foucault's 
critique of history, and Isenberg pushes that critique farther, I do not see that 
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Isenberg herself has yet fully delineated, or even adumbrated, what we may 
envision as post-Foucaldian post-history. 
Shank and Isenberg both exemplify and propose useful ways that recent 
theory helps in the critical evaluation of historiography. Saul Cornell more 
directly tries to set an agenda for future history-writing in "Splitting the Differ-
ence: Textualism, Contextualism, and Post-Modern History." This substantial 
essay is full of sharp insights. I especially admire the recurrent, crucial distinction 
Cornell draws between the epistemological and sociological claims of 
deconstruction (that is, what is undecidable at the level of theoretical knowledge 
may nonetheless be determined at the level of social power). At the same time, 
precisely because it covers so much and makes so many judgments, this was the 
paper of the three that allowed me the strongest sense of the difference between 
the understandings I work with—even when I am writing what is explicitly 
defined as literary history—and the understandings, apparently, shared by 
historians. 
Cornell's most insistent theme, the necessary distinction between text and 
context, does not come clear to me at the theoretical level where he locates it. I 
acknowledge a distinction between text and context just as I acknowledge a 
distinction between "foreground" and "background," but I think of both distinc-
tions as wholly provisional, conjunctural: as matters of where you're standing and 
what you're trying to look at. Surely the historian's greatest concern is not to 
defend the boundaries of what Cornell at moments tempts me to call "context as 
such" but rather to figure out which of the innumerable possible contexts that 
might be adduced will be most productive for interpreting a particular "text." And 
what is text for one inquiry, of course, may be context for another. 
The previous paragraph stands as I wrote it for the AHA panel, but over the 
summer, I turned to Quentin Skinner, whose work Cornell signaled as "the most 
sophisticated efforts to ground historical contextualism." I was delighted to find 
that Skinner does not disagree with me. He sees the "positive task" of historians 
not as finding but as constructing a context: "we must seek to surround the 
particular statements . . . in which we are interested with an intellectual context 
that serves to lend adequate support to it." He continues, "An understanding even 
of a received canon of major figures requires us to surround them with whatever 
intellectual context makes best sense of them." And following J. G. A. Pocock, 
Skinner emphasizes that "there is no implication that the relevant context need be 
an immediate one." The upshot of his approach, he considers it "perhaps worth 
underlining," is in fact to challenge "any categorical distinction between texts and 
contexts."4 Even in his early work, Skinner makes quite clear that he is not a 
strong contextualist: "I have not been concerned . . . to lend support to this very 
strong version of what [F. W.] Bateson has called 'the discipline of contextual 
reading'."5 
Indeed, if in Cornell's terms it is strong textualists for whom "context is not 
a fixed background" but rather "foreground and background are each textualized 
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and the connections between them must be read inter-textually," then Skinner 
may even be a strong textualist, for in a programmatic self-definition, he specifies 
his "approach" as "historical" but also as "intertextual." For Cornell, Foucault's 
strong textualism places "particular texts" in relation to "larger structures of 
power and meaning" called "discourses." Likewise for Skinner "the idea of 
discourse, not individual authors, becomes the main focus of attention" in 
following out the implications of his position.6 Skinner, however, clearly does not 
take pleasure in the kind of company I am surrounding him with as a context that 
may make good sense of his positions. For, contra Cornell's claim that Skinner 
now recognizes "the importance of reader-response," Skinner himself sees 
reader-response analysis as "purely consumer-oriented" (with a reference to 
Fish), and he finds Derrida's concern with free play "interesting to connoisseurs 
of the more decadent forms of individualism" (with a note speaking more bluntly 
of "anti-historical rot").7 Skinner is a tremendously learned, intelligent, and 
influential student of ideas in history, but I do not see that he has treated significant 
thinkers of his own time with anything like the care he would require of an 
undergraduate studying any text of political theory. To find individualism the 
point of Derrida's jeu is an error comparable to finding chastity the point of 
Machiavelli's virtu. 
If Skinner thus proved more comforting but less instructive than I had hoped 
in my attempt to make real to my self what Cornell calls "the conventional division 
between text and context essential to virtually all traditional forms of historiog-
raphy," I looked to the Oxford English Dictionary. Surely here I could find good, 
old, explicit, banal citations from stodgy, recognizable authorities. But what I 
found suggests instead to me that the discourse within which Cornell is writing 
may well be that of current historiography—for example, I was amazed to 
discover in another ambitious recent encounter between historians and current 
theory the claim that "postmodernists efface the distinction between text and 
context."8 Yet no matter how widely shared by three academic generations of 
current historians, the terms of that discourse may be rather more limited and 
specialized, a much briefer and smaller tradition, than Cornell believes. 
In the OED, all the primary senses given for context are what Cornell would 
call instead "textual." The earliest, now obsolete, meanings include: (1) "the 
weaving together of words and sentences; construction of speech, literary 
composition" and (2) "the connection or coherence between the parts of a 
discourse." The still current sense given is: (4) "the whole structure of a 
connected passage regarded in its bearing upon any of the parts which constitute 
it; the parts which immediately precede or follow any particular passage or 'text' 
and determine its meaning." Only in what the OED calls "transferred" and 
"figurative" usage do the citations begin to approach Cornell's usage, but all in 
ways that still make felt the con of context, that is, the way text and context form 
a single whole, broken up only by the specific focus of attention on a particular 
part. Most of the added range of the word registered in the recent Supplement to 
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the OED comes in uses from linguistics and philosophy of language, except for 
an amazing definition of contextualism: "the policy or practice, in literary 
criticism, of setting a poem or other work in its cultural context." In fact, the 1955 
citation for this sense of contextualism discusses the "Batesonian sense" newly 
given the term. This refers to literary critic and historian F. W. Bateson, whose 
"discipline of contextual reading" I quoted Skinner as not supporting and whose 
1953 "The Functions of Criticism at the Present Time," from which this phrase 
comes, was cited by Skinner, in the second footnote of his pathbreaking 1969 
"Meaning and Understanding of the History of Ideas," to exemplify the emerging 
contextualist "orthodoxy" from which Skinner himself dissented.9 
If the key distinction that Cornell judges fundamental to preserving the 
secure identity of the traditional study and practice of history comes from textual 
uses and literary studies, then I ask why should all three papers choose to ignore 
literary studies (literary criticism and literary history, as distinguished from the 
extradisciplinary area called theory that is nowadays more often a concern for 
people in literature than for other kinds of scholars) in considering good or bad 
examples of practices that historians might now wish to turn to? 
The special virtue of literary studies, in the context of Cornell's concerns, is 
that our facts, the basic materials of our historical research, are also fictions. In 
other words, we have long had to live with the situation Shank defines, in which 
the "real" is already "textual." Hamlet may speak, to use Cornell's terms, on a 
"stage," but Shakespeare was writing in the "market-place," and any study of 
Hamlet must eventually take account of both these dimensions. The several-
decades-long movement that I sloganize as "new literary history" (using the title 
of the journal founded by Ralph Cohen in 1969) has been trying to develop 
analytical and compositional techniques to bring together the split disciplines of 
what had become by the 1960s purely interpretive literary criticism and purely 
documentary literary scholarship. 
To my understanding, and in disagreement with Cornell, Juergen Habermas, 
for all his many virtues, has no fundamental contribution to make to this project 
because his understanding of literature is impoverished, compared to many of his 
important models such as Theodor Adorno, Walter Benjamin, and Herbert 
Marcuse.10 Habermas remains committed to a radical Kantian separation of 
spheres that doesn't allow literature the seriousness readers and writers alike 
often wish to claim for it. To give force to such seriousness, I wish I could discuss 
at length Culture and Imperialism (1993) by Edward W. Said, cited by Cornell 
as a "literary theorist," but about whom there is much more to say. Briefly, 
however, just because this scholar and long-time public advocate of Palestinian 
national independence is not "for" imperialism does not mean that he is "against" 
a culture that is nonetheless inseparable from imperialism. The "contrapuntal" 
mode of critical writing that Said has devised to recount and analyze instances of 
this inseparability over two centuries will bear long meditation by anyone trying 
to imagine "history after post-structuralism."11 
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What we may call "philosopher's examples," such as Cornell's distinction 
between poems and death warrants, or the stage and the market, operate to clarify 
our unexamined, ordinarily operating assumptions. But in the actual process of 
doing innovative intellectual work, we exceed our everyday assumptions. This 
is true of Foucault's work from the 60s into the 80s, and it is no less true of the 
work by the great social historians, living and dead, of the last thirty years. E. P. 
Thompson, in rescuing the unemployed stocking-loom weaver or the follower of 
Joanna Southcott from the "enormous condescension of posterity"; Natalie Z. 
Davis in finding women's history in archives where it had been invisible; Eugene 
Genovese in using Gramsci's theory of hegemony against the grain to show that 
slaves, too, had made their world: all these figures offered examples of work 
accomplished which have inspired scholars in other disciplines, such as my own. 
I can testify that masterpieces of social history helped prepare me for the long, 
hard work I put into studying poststructuralism in the hope that it would make me 
a better literary historian. 
As a result, in my just-published book-length contribution, on mid-nine-
teenth-century prose narratives, to the Cambridge History of American Litera-
ture, three major features differ from any earlier instance I know of the genre.12 
First, and most emphasized in my overall structuring of the materials, I treat the 
literary not as a given, by which I may measure and evaluate the materials I study, 
but as the object of my historical inquiry: the plot of my history is the emergence 
in the United States of literary narrative as one among an array of discourses. 
Second, I choose as my fundamental unit of intelligibility not the author but the 
generic system: although I discuss authors and their careers, every major author 
is split among several chapters, no chapter is exclusively on a single author, and 
all chapter titles refer to modes of writing. Finally, I make of the nation a problem, 
rather than both a presupposition and a goal. Too often the voice of American 
literary historiography has seemed to say, "We are already American, and this 
history reveals to us what this means." I hope to be doing something different, 
by making national narrative and its role in political formations a topic for 
analysis rather than a given. 
All of this, I hope, makes a work worth consideration by other kinds of 
historians for its attempt to construct an explicit metanarrative even while 
exercising suspicion against the great modern figures of wholeness,13 such as 
author, nation, and literature itself. It is not "history from below," but it tries to 
achieve a disquieting distance from the usual narrative forms of high-cultural 
history. Let me urge historians, then, not always to seek the highest level of theory 
in looking to other disciplines. Especially for what Cornell calls "pragmatic 
historians," one may learn more by studying how poststructuralism has affected 
practice than by looking at manifestoes, polemics, and overviews. 
I would like to conclude, then, with a few observations on an example of new 
practice: James Livingston's remarkable book, Pragmatism and the Political 
Economy of Cultural Revolution, 1850-1940,14 published since the AHA panel, 
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which may actually stand as a major work of US history in full dialogue with the 
developments discussed in these papers as "theory" and "post-modernism" and 
"post-structuralism." It speaks to Isenberg' s concerns because it is part of a larger 
project explaining "how and why pragmatism and feminism raise the same 
questions for political philosophy" (382 n. 24). It combines just the elements 
recommended by Cornell—metanarrative, neo-Marxism, pragmatism, and a 
concern with the public sphere—to propose a reorientation of intellectual and 
cultural history deeply in touch with advanced work in social and economic 
history. I cannot do justice to the work's bold and subtle constellation of materials 
but can only bring out elements in its procedures that resonate with the topics 
already under discussion. 
Take this passage from near the end as focusing Livingston's ambitions: "to 
grasp in the rise of corporate capitalism and its attendant forms of solidarity the 
possibility of transcending the antinomies of modern subjectivity, and accord-
ingly to recognize the prototypes of a postmodern subjectivity in the 'social self 
and the 'artificial person' sanctioned or validated by corporate capitalism" (278). 
To work through this agenda, Livingston, like Shank, challenges the "tragic," and 
spectatorial, stance of Jackson Lears, and other late-twentieth-century "young 
intellectuals." Invoking Kenneth Burke, Hegel, and Hayden White, Livingston 
proposes a revisionary metanarrative: "we might interpret the completed transi-
tion from proprietary to corporate capitalism as the first act of an unfinished 
comedy rather than the residue of tragedy. We might cast ourselves as something 
other than its audience or critics" (98). 
Against this influential, probably dominant, tragic tendency within current 
American "left" historiography, Livingston interprets pragmatism to argue that 
the end of "modern subjectivity" (81) need not be identical to "the loss of selfhood 
itself (81), but that this changed understanding is only possible if historians 
change "the form in which they have cast their historical narratives" (80). In 
Livingston's reading of pragmatism, "the change we know as the transition from 
proprietary to corporate capitalism loses its pathos" (200). For pragmatism 
instead allows us to find "this change as significant of new possibilities" (201). 
The change is no longer construed as an "ending" but as "a transition to a social 
order and cognitive regime in which neither self nor knowledge can be located or 
stabilized by reference to external necessity" (201). 
And yet I felt a certain disappointment in Livingston's ending, which the 
papers of this panel have helped me to understand. In Livingston's redefinition 
of the self, through his understanding of William James, a new key term emerges 
on the book's very last two pages: "the self.. .is the context within which changes 
and choices become intelligible and meaningful"; the self "constructs, or rather 
becomes... this historical context, this unfolding relation between here and there, 
now and then"; in James, as opposed to Kant, the self is "not a substance removed 
from the vicissitudes of time" but is instead "a social relation or context" (293-
4). Apparently despite metanarrative, neo-Marxism, and pragmatism, when a 
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historian wants to speak of what really counts, the disciplinary signature term will 
be context. 
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